This is a study of argumentation in three different kinds of high level, confidential, foreign policy settings: a collegial setting, a bureaucratic setting, and a bargaining setting. The causal and value assertions of the participants were coded using the detailed records of these three settings. The data show to be inadequate a defense/ attack model of argumentation in which the participants support their own arguments to make them resistant to attack, while attacking the weak spots in others'stated positions. In fact, there are few assertions which are supported by specific evidence, almost no mutually supported causal arguments, and the assertions which were attacked were no less emphasized than the assertions which were not attacked. More in accord with the data is the novel-arguments approach in which the key factor in persuasive argumentation is the development of arguments which others have not already taken into account.
sure that their own initial positions are necessarily the best ones. When a policy problem arises, a person's or organization's interests in one or another possible course of action is often far from obvious. Interests must be discovered; or to put it another way, they must be developed piecemeal.
Each of our standard approaches to decision-making recognizes this problem, but each does little to solve it. The unitary rationalactor model (Allison, 1971) and the statistical models of decisionmaking take for granted that the utilities of the entire organization are given in advance. The organizational-process model discusses the role of standard operating procedures and the tendency of decision makers to satisfice rather than optimize their (1) the opportunity to talk, since self-expression helps the development of one's own thoughts,
(2) the opportunity to listen to arguments offered by others, and (3) the opportunity to persuade others of one's own current viewpoint.
A simple paradigm would be that people in committees have initial positions based on the arguments that they have developed on their own or heard before the meeting. Then, they express themselves (not necessarily all that they know or without distortion) to convince others that their initially favored view is best. But they also listen to see if they should be persuaded. That is to say, each recognizes that he may want to change. March and Simon (1958) warn that the appearance of rational discussion may be exaggerated to minimize organizational conflict. Still, rational discussion is not to be dismissed. It is a vital aspect of the policy process. As Neustadt (1960: 23) (Cross, 1977) . The nature of the agreement itself is often based on a formula and details for its implementation (Zartman, 1977) . Exactly which formula emerges and how its details are specified is determined through the process of argumentation. (Allison, 1971) , in contrast to the relatively collegial process more favored by those who found merit in the operations of the ad hoc Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis, such as George (1972 George ( , 1975 and Janis (1972 (March and Simon, 1958: 129-135; Walton and McKersie, 1965: 11-125; Lindblom, 1965: 33 (Nakane, 1970 (Woodward et al., 1949: 342-351, 463-473, and 499-508). The records of the British Eastern committee consist of verbatim transcripts which have been declassified only recently (Eastern Committee, 1918 Axelrod ( 1976: 74-95 Axelrod (1976: 82-84) , and for the text of the coding rules themselves, see Wrightson (1976) 2. Other connectors that are used include: 0 for "no effect,"&oplus; for "zero or positive effect," &ominus; for "zero or negative effect," M for "matters" (i.e., positive or negative effect), and U for "universal" (i.e., any effect is possible). Axelrod (1976: 84-86 Axelrod (1976: 61-64, 343-348 (Nakane, 1970 Burnstein and Vinokur (1973) (1974) , Burnstein and Vinokur (1975) , Vinokur et al. (1975) , Burnstein and Vinokur (forthcoming 12. See especially Lindblom (1965; 1968) , Argyris (1967) , George (1972; , Janis (1972) , and Cohen and March (1974) .
